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Abstract
Contemporary societies are often “polarized”, in the sense that sub-groups within these
societies hold stably opposing beliefs, even when there is a fact of the matter. Extant
models of polarization do not capture the idea that some beliefs are true and others false.
Here we present a model, based on the network epistemology framework of Bala and Goyal
[”Learning from neighbors”, Rev. Econ. Stud. 65(3), 784-811 (1998)], in which polarization
emerges even though agents gather evidence about their beliefs, and true belief yields a pay-
off advantage. As we discuss, these results are especially relevant to polarization in scientific
communities, for these reasons. The key mechanism that generates polarization involves
treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively
different from one’s own.
1. Introduction
Is anthropogenic climate change real? This question, asked in the wrong setting, will spark
a furious debate. Some members of the U.S. public are convinced that global warming is
a liberal conspiracy dreamt up to restrict personal liberties. Others believe that climate
change is the most serious existential threat facing humanity. Although there has long
been a consensus among climate scientists that anthropogenic warming poses serious risks
(Oreskes, 2004), there does not appear to be an emerging consensus concerning this issue
among the American public at large (McCright and Dunlap, 2011). This is an example
of what is sometimes called “polarization”—subgroups within a society maintain stable,
opposing beliefs, even in the face of extensive debate on an issue.1
Email addresses: cailino@uci.edu (Cailin O’Connor), weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1Some authors use the term “polarization”, or more specifically, “belief” or “attitude polarization”, to
refer to the more limited phenomenon in which two individuals with opposing credences both strengthen their
beliefs in light of identical evidence. Other authors, particularly in psychology, use “group polarization” to
refer to situations in which discussion among like-minded individuals strengthens individual beliefs beyond
what anyone in the group started with. As noted, we are using the term “polarization” in a sense common
in political discourse, to describe situations in which beliefs or opinions of a group fail to converge towards
a consensus, or else actually diverge, over time. Bramson et al. (2017) differentiate between ways one might
define or measure polarization in this more general sense.
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There is now a large literature that attempts to model polarization in the socio-political
realm.2 A general take-away from this body of work is that polarization can occur when
agents influence each others’ opinions, but where the degree of this influence depends on the
similarity between agents’ opinions. This sort of situation can generate feedback loops that
stabilize polarization. Subgroups form where actors share beliefs and, as a result, are only
influenced by those in their group.
The models considered in this literature do not generally treat beliefs as having different
truth-values, and agents do not influence one another by sharing evidence supporting their
beliefs. In other words these models show how polarization can emerge from various opinion
dynamics, but not how polarization can persist in the face of evidence demonstrating that
acting in accordance with one belief yields a distinct advantage.3 In many cases of polariza-
tion, this seems appropriate, since the underlying positions of those involved are motivated
by moral, religious, or political values. On abortion, for instance—another issue on which
the U.S. public is polarized—religious beliefs motivate many of those who oppose legalized
abortion, while those who support it are often driven by feminist values. Similarly, social and
political values play a role in attitudes about climate change: liberals tend to believe that
central governing bodies have a responsibility to protect shared environmental resources,
while conservatives argue that a free market will generate suitable responses endogenously,
without government intervention.
But differences in values of this sort are not the only important aspect of polarization.
For instance, in the case of climate change, it is not merely that there are disagreements
concerning what policies to adopt; there is also polarization in belief concerning matters
of fact about the causes and likely consequences of global warming. This is so despite the
fact that there is ample evidence available and the long-term consequence of injudicious
policies are potentially severe. Indeed, polarization can appear even in communities that
broadly share values—including in scientific communities, which can become deeply divided
over issues such as what foundational theory to adopt, what methodology is appropriate,
or what the truth of the matter is in some case. For instance, as we will discuss below,
researchers working on Lyme disease seem to have polarized. How can agents acting under
such conditions reach opinions that are so deeply divided?
Our aim in this paper is to show how a group of learners who share evidence, and who
have the same aims and values, can nonetheless become polarized. We do so by presenting
a simple model, based on the network epistemology framework developed by economists
Bala and Goyal (1998) and introduced to philosophy of science by Zollman (2007), in which
agents gather and share evidence concerning which of two possible actions yields a better
expected payoff. In this model, all agents have the same preferences and there is a fact of
the matter concerning which action is preferable. The agents all have access to the same
evidence, which they continually gather and use to update their beliefs. However, they treat
evidence from other agents as uncertain, using a simple heuristic according to which agents
2We survey this literature in section 3; see (Bramson et al., 2017) for a review.
3As we discuss below, there are some exceptions to this generalization—most notably, in work by Olsson
(2013)—but the model we present here is substantially different and, we believe, more perspicuous.
2
whose beliefs are distant from their own are judged to be more epistemically unreliable. As
we show, epistemic communities in which agents employ this heuristic can become stably
polarized. As a result of this polarization, the accuracy of scientific beliefs in the community
is typically worse.
Furthermore, while we do not claim that employing this heuristic is individually rational,
we do claim that it is justifiable and that similar heuristics are widespread. Indeed, it is
essential to scientific practice that scientists make judgments concerning the reliability of
other scientists’ work, and condition their beliefs accordingly.4 That this sort of judgment
can, at least in some cases, lead to polarization is therefore striking—and can help explain
why we observe polarization in real scientific communities. It also provides a novel example
of how individually justifiable epistemic heuristics can lead to group-level behavior that is
not truth-conducive (Mayo-Wilson et al., 2011).
In the next section, we present the case of Lyme disease, wherein a scientific community
has become highly polarized. Section 3 will describe other models of polarization and then
introduce the model we will analyze here. In section 4 we describe the main results of the
paper, which are that treating the evidence produced by those with whom we disagree as
uncertain can lead to polarization, and that this impairs the ability of a scientific community
to achieve true beliefs. In the conclusion, we discuss implications of the work presented here,
both for philosophy of science and for social epistemology.
2. Chronic Lyme and the Polarization of Science
Rheumatologist Allen Steere first identified Lyme disease as a new, tick-borne illness during
the mid-1970s. At the time, hundreds of people in Lyme, Connecticut and surrounding
communities were suffering from a mysterious set of maladies—joint pain, arthritis, extreme
fatigue, headaches, brain fog. One of these sufferers, Polly Murray, was referred to Dr.
Steere.5 Diligent work by Steere and others eventually linked these symptoms to tick bites,
and not long thereafter the spirochete responsible was isolated by medical entomologist Willy
Burgdorfer, and named Borrelia burgdorferi is his honor (Steere et al., 1977; Burgdorfer
et al., 1982).
This discovery was a savior for patients like Polly Murray and others infected with Lyme.
Since the spirochete is treatable with antibiotics, a course of therapy was often enough to
make a drastic difference in the lives of those who had been infected. Despite this, by the
1990s, Steere was receiving death threats from angry Lyme patients. How did the man whose
4Psychologists often appeal to motivated reasoning in explaining polarization. For example, humans tend
to engage in confirmation bias, which involves seeking out and assimilating new information supporting their
already deeply held beliefs (Lord et al., 1979). But that is not what is going on here: agents to not selectively
update on evidence that is probable given their current beliefs; they do so on the basis of their judgments
about the source of the evidence, irrespective of what the evidence tends to support. We take this to be
more epistemically justifiable—which makes the appearance of polarization in the presence of this heuristic
more surprising.
5This history was reported in the New York Times article ‘Stalking Dr. Steere over Lyme Disease’,
published June 17, 2001.
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discoveries paved the way for everything we know about Lyme end up a reviled figure by the
very patients he sought to cure? In the early 1990s, Steere became worried that Lyme was
being treated as catchall for patients with Lyme-like symptoms who could not be otherwise
diagnosed. He also worried that harmful courses of antibiotics were being prescribed to
patients who did not need them. After investigation, he began to advocate for more careful
diagnosis and treatment of Lyme (Steere et al., 1993). Thus began the “Lyme Wars”. At
the heart of this now decades long scientific debate are 1) the question of whether Lyme
can persist in patients after a short cycle of antibiotics, and 2) the question of whether long
term doses of antibiotics are successful in improving the symptoms of Lyme patients.
On one side are thousands of patients, and the physicians who treat them, who say that
“chronic Lyme” is ruining their lives. They describe debilitating symptoms similar to those
known to occur if Lyme goes untreated and enters the late stage of the illness—arthritis,
pain, fatigue, and a host of cognitive problems. Many of them seek treatment from “Lyme-
literate” physicians, who claim that intravenous, long term courses of antibiotics are both
necessary and successful in treating these patients. As they point out, studies have shown
that even after intense courses of antibiotics, macaques and some other species can still test
positive for Lyme and can even reinfect ticks with the Lyme spirochete (Embers et al., 2012;
Straubinger et al., 2000). Documentaries, such as the 2008 Under Our Skin, and first hand
accounts such as Allie Cashel’s 2015 Suffering in Silence describe the horrors of chronic
Lyme, and portray the doctors who do not believe in it as either incompetent or under the
sway of insurance firms who do not want to pay for long courses of treatment.
On the other side of the debate are the majority of physicians, including Steere, who
believe that chronic Lyme is actually a combination of post-Lyme syndrome–a set of symp-
toms that are the result of previous damage by Borrelia burgdorferi rather than current
infection—and other diseases, such as fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome, that are
themselves poorly understood (Steere et al., 2004). They point out that random control
trials have shown no benefit for long term antibiotic treatment for chronic Lyme patients
(Klempner et al., 2001), and that, in many cases, those who are sick do not test positive for
Lyme.
In the case of chronic Lyme, researchers have apparently failed to approach consensus,
and even have even become increasingly convinced that those on the other side are not
to be trusted. In other words, they are polarizing in much the way the public sometimes
polarizes on political and social issues. The surprising thing about this case, though, is that
many values and goals are the same on both sides of the debate. By this we mean that
both establishment physicians and Lyme literate ones seem to want to reduce the suffering
of Lyme patients.6 They all seem to want to discover the truth of what is happening with
chronic Lyme. They all have access to similar sorts of evidence—they see and treat patients
with Lyme and they read the same articles. In a case like this, we might expect beliefs in the
group to start converging to a consensus. The fact that this does not seem to be happening
presents a puzzle.
6It is, of course, possible that there are some Lyme researchers influenced by industry funding, or who
are trying to bilk patients. This does not seem to be the case for most of the physicians involved.
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One striking feature of the Lyme disease research community, as noted, is profound
mistrust between groups adhering to different views concerning the status of chronic Lyme
disease. Members of these two groups have access to the evidence gathered by the other,
but they appear to discount it. Establishment physicians think Lyme literate physicians are
quacks, and so put little weight on their clinical experience and, arguably more rigorous,
published studies. Lyme literate physicians think that Steere and his collaborators are
swayed by industry interests, and are producing biased science. As we will describe in
the next section, this sort of relationship between belief and trust is what often generates
polarized opinions in models of polarization. What is novel here is the observation that
we can get these sorts of polarized outcomes in a scientific community where researchers
are explicitly motivated by epistemic aims, where they gather evidence from the world, and
where they use reasonable heuristics in determining how to update their beliefs in light of
new evidence.
3. Modeling Polarization
Empirical work suggests that, in general, discussion tends to lead to greater agreement
among individuals.7 Many models of influence between people attempt to capture and
explain this tendency towards shared opinions (Axelrod, 1997; Hegselmann et al., 2002).
The question for those interested in polarization is why, despite this general tendency, some
groups never converge to uniform beliefs. The key ingredient to generating polarization in
models of opinions dynamics is to make the social influence of one individual on another
dependent on how similar their beliefs or positions are. Many models have been developed
in which incorporating this sort of dependence can produce polarization.8
In an influential example, Hegselmann et al. (2002) assume that individuals in a group
hold some opinion between 0 and 1.9 These individuals update their opinions over time by
averaging them with group members, but they only include group members whose current
beliefs are within some distance of their own. As they show, as this distance grows smaller,
groups will fail to reach consensus on an opinion, and instead form subgroups, each of
which jointly holds the same opinion.10 If similarity of belief is not taken into account in
determining influence, on the other hand, the group always converges to consensus.11 Macy
et al. (2003) look at networked agents who adopt binary opinion states, and whose states
are influenced by neighbors depending on weights they assign to them. The weights in turn
7For example, Festinger et al. (1950), in a classic study, showed how location around housing courts, and
thus social interaction, importantly determined opinions in a study of MIT students. Students tended to
adopt the beliefs of their neighbors.
8Again, for a philosophically sensitive review of models of polarization see (Bramson et al., 2017).
9In work that predates this, Axelrod (1997) provides a model where cultures are represented by variants
(lists of numbers) and where similarity of these variants determines how likely they are to adopt other
variants from neighbors in a grid. In this way ‘cultural similarity’ determines cultural influence. As he
shows, stably different cultures, which we might think of as polarized in some sense, can co-exist if they
have no overlap and thus do not influence each other at all.
10They label the outcome where just two subgroups with divergent opinions emerge as ‘polarization’.
11In this tradition, see also Deffuant et al. (2002); Deffuant (2006).
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update based on the similarity of opinion states, leading to polarized groups who do not
trust each other. Baldassarri and Bearman (2007) assume that individuals only interact
with those who have similar interests and similar opinions, and observe both polarization of
beliefs and homophily—where two groups stop interacting with each other based on their
different beliefs.12
The models just described all concern cases in which actors choose between opinions or
beliefs that are equally good, in the sense that there are no external reasons to hold one
belief over another. Agents do not seek evidence from the world in forming their beliefs, and
beliefs play no role in action. There are a few models in the literature which look instead
at cases where one belief is superior. Hegselmann et al. (2006) give a model much like their
original opinion model, but where some or all agents are attracted to one ‘true’ opinion,
while also taking peer opinions into account. They take this attraction to correspond to an
ability on the part of the agents to gather evidence or observe the world in such a way that
guides their opinions toward truth. They find, however, that whenever each individual has
even a small attraction to the truth, they all eventually find it. In other words, polarization
is only possible if at least some agents care only about the opinions of others. In this sense,
their model does not seem to capture what is going on in cases of scientific polarization.13
The other two models in this realm aim at understanding group deliberation. Singer et al.
(2018) look at a deliberating group that shares “reasons” for belief—positive and negative
numbers which they add up to draw a conclusion—chosen from some fixed set. They show
how subgroups can polarize when individuals only forget those reasons that do not cohere
with their most likely current conclusion. In this model, however, the ‘’‘reasons” do not
correspond to evidence gathered from actually performing actions informed by the belief.
In addition, while their model arguably has a representation of a better position (i.e., the
one with more reasons to support it), they do not represent agents capable of having true
or false beliefs as we do.
The model most like ours is from Olsson (2013), who use the Laputa network episte-
mology framework to investigate polarization.14 In their model, agents deliberate over a
proposition p, and test the world with varying degrees of accuracy. They use Bayesian
updating to adjust their credences in p based on their evidence and others’ statements of
belief. They can adjust their levels of trust in others’ statements (and thus their updating)
based on whether they have similar beliefs. The key difference between the models is that
their agents communicate by stating their beliefs. Ours actually share unbiased evidence
with each other—and yet, as we will see, polarization still appears.15
12See also Galam and Moscovici (1991); Galam (2010, 2011); Nowak et al. (1990); Ma¨s and Flache (2013);
La Rocca et al. (2014). In addition, a number of modelers have shown how belief polarization—updating in
different directions for the same evidence—can be rational. This can occur under the right conditions for
agents with different priors or with different background beliefs (Dixit and Weibull, 2007; Jern et al., 2014;
Benoˆıt and Dubra, 2014).
13For more work in this framework see Kurz and Rambau (2011); Liu et al. (2014). One key difference
between these models and ours is that their agents can never come to disregard, or give up on, a possibly
true theory.
14This framework is first presented in Angere (2010).
15In addition, the way their agents gather evidence arguably less closely mimics many cases of scientific
6
3.1. Epistemic Networks and Uncertain Evidence
As noted above, we work in the network epistemology framework developed by Bala and
Goyal (1998). In this model, agents decide between two actions that have different prob-
abilities of yielding some fixed payoff. The agents choose which action to take based on
their current belief about which has the highest expected return. That belief, in turn, is
informed by the success of their own past actions and those of other agents as shared in a
social network. Zollman (2007) adapts this model to represent the emergence of scientific
consensus.16
In more detail, the basic model consists of a network of agents, each of whom is connected
to some or all of the other agents in the network. The agents decide between two actions:
action A (All right) and action B (Better). Action A is well understood, and all agents
know that performing it generates success with probability .5. The success rate of action
B is uncertain: agents know that action B is either slightly better (success rate of .5 + )
or slightly worse (success rate of .5− ), but they do not know which case obtains. In fact,
action B has a success rate of .5 + , and so action B is preferable to action A. The goal is
for agents to determine which of the actions has a higher success rate. This is an example
of a “two-armed bandit problem”, so called because it matches a case where actors must
choose one of two arms on a slot machine that yield payoffs with differential rates.17
Each agent in the network has some credence between 0 and 1 that action B is better than
action A. An agent with credence .54, for example, thinks there is a 54% chance that B is the
better action. These credences are initially randomly assigned. In each round of simulation,
actors choose the action that they believe has the highest expected outcome. If their credence
is < .5 they choose action A, otherwise action B. (In what follows, we sometimes say that an
agent “accepts theory A” if their credence is < .5, and thus they believe action A is better;
otherwise they “accept theory B”.) They then perform their action some (fixed) number of
times, n, and observe how often it succeeds.18 Agents subsequently use Bayes’ rule to update
their credence based on both their own experience, and the experiences of their neighbors
on the network. Since there is no uncertainty regarding action A (it is known to succeed
exactly half the time), performing action A provides no information to the agents; thus,
agents’ beliefs change only if they or at least one of their neighbors test theory B.19
process as they receive private signals from a distribution, rather than sampling data points.
16This framework has been used in philosophy of science by Zollman (2010); Mayo-Wilson et al. (2011);
Kummerfeld and Zollman (2015); Holman and Bruner (2015); Rosenstock et al. (2017); Weatherall et al.
(2017); Weatherall and O’Connor (2017); O’Connor and Weatherall (2019). Zollman (2013) provides a
review of the literature up to 2013.
17The version of the model we consider here follows Zollman (2007) very closely, because unlike later
versions considered by Zollman (2010) and others, the beliefs of the agents in the 2007 model are captured
by a single number. This made representing distance between agents beliefs in our model much more
tractable.
18Note, this parameter was added to the model by Zollman (2007) and does not appear in the work of
Bala and Goyal (1998).
19Notice that this framework can model situations outside the realm of science. The main features of
interest are agents who choose between two actions, have beliefs about the efficacy of these actions, and
7
As agents update their beliefs over time, one of two things happens. Either all agents
come to (erroneously) accept theory A, and so do not gather new, informative evidence, or
else all agents come to accept theory B with very high credence, so that the chances they
ever revert to incorrect beliefs become vanishingly small. In other words, the network tends
to arrive at a consensus, wherein all agents (approximately) stably accept either the true
theory or the false theory.
In the Bala-Goyal model as we have been describing it, all agents treat evidence gathered
by themselves and other agents in the network in the same way. But as we saw in the
case of Lyme disease discussed above, under some circumstances, members of a scientific
community stop trusting the evidence produced by other colleagues. In such cases, agents
do not update their beliefs on evidence produced by other agents in the way that they do
on the evidence they produce themselves. To capture the dynamics of such a situation, we
alter the model studied by Bala and Goyal (1998) and by Zollman (2007) so that agents
treat evidence produced by other agents as uncertain. These agents then update their beliefs
using Jeffrey’s rule instead of Bayes’ rule.
Jeffrey conditionalization, unlike strict Bayesian conditionalization, allows actors to up-
date beliefs in light of uncertain evidence.20 We use it in the present case as follows. Suppose
that Ian tells Jill he observed some evidence, E. Further suppose that Jill does not fully
trust Ian’s data gathering practices, meaning she has credence Pf (E) ≤ 1 that the evidence
he described obtained. Under Jeffrey conditionalization Jill will update her beliefs, in light
of Ian’s evidence, using the following formula:
Pf (H) = Pi(H|E) · Pf (E) + Pi(H| ∼ E) · Pf (∼ E)
This equation says that Jill’s final belief in the hypothesis, Pf (H), is equal to her credence
that the evidence is real, Pf (E), multiplied by the belief she would obtain via strict condi-
tionalization on that evidence, Pi(H|E), plus her credence that the evidence did not occur,
Pf (∼ E), multiplied by the belief she would have by strict conditionalization if it had not
occurred, Pi(H| ∼ E).
The Jeffrey conditionalization formula alone is not sufficient to fix Jill’s belief; we also
need to specify the credence that Jill assigns to the evidence, which we assume to be con-
ditional on its source. We consider two ways of doing this. In both cases, we take Jill’s
credence to be a decreasing function of the difference in beliefs between the two agents. On
the first approach, we suppose that agents trust those with more similar beliefs, but that
they completely ignore evidence from agents whose beliefs diverge by too much. On the
second approach, we assume that when Ian’s beliefs are very far from Jill’s, she actually
is so suspicious of him him that she updates away from what his evidence seems to show.
(Likewise, Cook and Lewandowsky (2016) find that conservatives engage in contrary belief
updating upon learning about the scientific consensus on climate change.)
share evidence relevant to these beliefs. We take these to be key features of scientific communities, but also
some other sorts of everyday communities where individuals share evidence relevant to belief.
20See Jeffrey (1990, Ch. 11).
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The idea here is that as a responsible scientist, Jill must assess the reliability of the
evidence produced by her colleagues. There are many ways in which she might attempt to
do this, but one plausible heuristic is to evaluate the reliability of the evidence on the basis
of her perception of Ian’s past epistemic success. Jill’s own beliefs are her clearest guide to
evaluating whether Ian has succeeded in forming reliable beliefs, and so in cases where their
beliefs differ, Jill supposes that Ian must be less reliable.
We will make the second approach, where evidence supporting theory B might actually
decrease credence in that theory, precise first, as in some ways the formula is simpler. Let
d be the absolute value of the difference between the Ian and Jill’s credences. We use the
following to characterize the uncertainty that Jill assigns to evidence produced by Ian as a
function of d:
Pf (E)(d) = max({1− d ·m · (1− Pi(E)), 0}). (1)
Here Pi(E) is Jill’s initial probability of the evidence occurring given her beliefs about theory
A and theory B and m is a multiplier that captures how quickly agents become uncertain
about the evidence of their peers as their beliefs diverge. Notice that d, the distance between
beliefs, will vary between 1, if one agent has complete belief in theory B and the other in
theory A, and 0, if both agents have the same credences in theory B. As d approaches 0,
Pf (E) approaches 1, meaning that the agent thinks the evidence is more and more certain.
(Observe that every agent is distance 0 from themselves, and so they treat their own evidence
as certain.) In this case, Jill’s update rule approximates strict conditionalization very well.
As d increases, meanwhile, at some point d ·m = 1. (If m = 2, for example, this occurs
when d = .5.) At this point the certainty that Jill assigns to Ian’s evidence is simply equal
to the Pi(E)—i.e., to Jill’s prior probability of the evidence occurring. In other words, she
completely ignores evidence from Ian, in the sense that her credence about theory B will be
unchanged in light of the evidence from Ian. As d further increases, so that d ·m > 1, Pf (E)
becomes smaller than the prior belief that the evidence would occur, Pi(E). In other words,
Jill believes that the evidence is less likely than she would have otherwise simply because
Ian shared it. Finally, since Pf (E) is to be interpreted as an agent’s credence, we require
that Pf ≥ 0.
For the approach where agents simply ignore evidence gathered by researchers they do
not trust, we use the following alternative alternative function to describe Jill’s uncertainty
about Ian’s evidence as a function of d:
Pf (E)(d) = 1−min(1, d ·m) · (1− Pi(E)). (2)
In this formula, we do not let d ·m grow larger than 1. This means that as beliefs diverge,
there is a point, d ·m = 1, after which agents simply ignore the data of their peers, always
assigning Pf (E) = Pi(E). The multiplier m then determines how far apart beliefs have to
be before individuals ignore the evidence of another researcher.
In what follows, we will refer to the approach using Eq. (1) as the one with “anti-
updating”; the approach using Eq. (2) will be the one with no anti-updating. Figure 1
shows an example of what each of these functions would look like for an agent with prior
probability Pi(E) = .75 and m = 2. The x-axis tracks distance in belief between the two
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Figure 1: An agent’s uncertainty about evidence as a function of distance between credences both for
anti-updating and simply ignoring evidence, m = 2 and Pi(E) = .75.
agents, which, as noted, ranges from 0 to 1. The y-axis tracks agent certainty in evidence
as a function of this distance. Up to a distance d = .5, the two functions are the same,
and certainty in evidence decreases linearly in distance between beliefs. After that, the
anti-updater thinks it is less likely the evidence occurred than her prior would suggest, and
the agent who ignores data thinks the evidence is just as likely as her prior belief predicts.
Of course (1) and (2) are arbitrary. The results we describe will be qualitatively similar
using different functions, as long as Pf (E) decreases sufficiently quickly with d. Indeed, as
a robustness check, we ran simulations for several additional functions for Pf (E), including
a logistic function (eg., Pf (E)(d) = 1/(1 + exp(m ∗ (d − 1/2)))) and an exponential (eg.
Pf (E)(d) = exp(−m ∗ d)).21 We found that the results were qualitatively robust across
different functional dependencies, as long as there is some value d0 such that for d > d0,
PF (E)(d) ≤ Pi(E). If this condition is not met, one does not get stable polarization, because
even as d approaches 1, agents continue to exert some influence on one another.22,23
21Observe that the values of m that make sense to consider vary between these functions and the linear
functions we focus on; for instance, for the logistic function, we studied m = 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 15, 17.5, 20, and
for the exponential we looked at m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
22So, for instance, if one considers a function of the form Pf (E)(d) = (1−PI(E))/(1+exp(m∗(d−1/2)))+
Pi(E), which is bounded from below by Pi(E) and never achieves this value on d ∈ [0, 1], polarization is
not stable. However, this sort of exponential drop-off in influence as a function of d dramatically increases
converge times, and so we find that polarization may still be effectively stable, a result that amplifies the
arguments we give below.
23There is another way of doing all of this, which is to suppose some probability distribution that describes
Jill’s credences about Ian’s dispositions to share E given that E did and did not obtain, given Jill’s own
prior Pi(E) and d, and then have her use Bayes’ rule to find her posterior Pf (E), given that Ian reports E.
But observe that doing this in detail would require an enormous number of modeling choices that would also
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4. Results
Our model involves several parameters. First, we vary the size of the scientific community,
testing values for K ranging from 2 to 20. We also vary the difference in success rate between
the well-understood action A and the better action B. The probability that A succeeds is
always PA = .5, and for the probability that B pays off we considered PB ranging from .501
to .8. This parameter controls how equivocal evidence will tend to be. As PB approaches
PA, the two actions become increasingly difficult to discriminate, and the number of spurious
results, i.e., results suggesting that action A is actually preferable to action B, increases. We
vary the number of tests each scientists runs every round, n from 1 to 100. This parameter
will also influence, on average, how many spurious results occur and how much they affect
belief. Smaller values of n are analogous to lower powered studies which are more likely to
yield misleading results.
Finally, we varym, the multiplier that determines how quickly scientists begin to mistrust
those with different beliefs, looking at values from 0 to 3.24 When m = 0, agents do not
discount evidence based on belief at all. When m = 1, the agents never fully discount the
evidence of other scientists (or engage in anti-updating), though they become less trusting
of the data as beliefs diverge. When m is higher, agents completely ignore or else anti-
update on individuals whose beliefs are more than some distance away from their own. (For
instance, as demonstrated in figure 1, if m = 2, this threshold is .5.) One thing we do not
vary is the network structure of the model. We test only complete networks, meaning that
agents communicate with every other member of their community. This means that when
agents polarize, it is in spite of the fact that they receive data from all their peers, and is
not a result of differential access to information.25
For each combination of parameter values we ran 1k trials of simulation, until one of three
measurable outcomes was reached—communities arrived at correct consensus (all beliefs
were greater than .99), incorrect consensus (all beliefs were less than .5), or polarization.
(We will say more about just what ‘polarization’ involves shortly.)
be largely arbitrary, and at the end of the day, one would find a formula with the salient features of (1) and
(2) (i.e., a monotonically decreasing function in d whose range lies in the relevant interval). More, one can
always use Bayes’ rule to work backward from Eq. (1) or Eq. (2) to a relationship between the conditional
probabilities P (Ian shared E|E) and P (Ian shared E| ∼ E) that must hold if we assume that Jill had such
credences and that she arrives at Pf (E) via strict conditionalization. And so these formulae can themselves
be interpreted as reflecting precisely the results of this procedure for (families of) distributions that might
represent Jill’s beliefs about Ian’s dispositions.
24Increaing m beyond this range had little effect on the results since trust already drops off steeply when
m = 3.
25Note that this means that distance in belief may be reconceptualized as a weight on each edge of the
network, so that initially there are random weights assigned, and then over time the network evolves so that
some connections become stronger and others weaker. In this sense, the model can be conceptualized as a
dynamic network.
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4.1. Ignoring Data
Let us first consider the version of the model where agents ignore data shared by those with
very different beliefs. Under many circumstances we observed stable polarization in these
scientific communities. In this version of the model, polarization involves the emergence of
two subgroups, one whose members all have credence > .99, and the rest with a variety
of stable, low credences, such that they prefer the worse theory. (More precisely, a stable
outcome is one in which every agent either (a) has credence > .99 or else (b) has credence
<= .5 such that their distance to all agents whose credence is > .99 satisfies m ∗ d >= 1.)
Because the agents with low credences are outside the “realm of influence” of those testing
the informative theory, they do not update their beliefs.26
To reiterate, when this model is run without uncertainty based on divergence of beliefs
(when m = 0), every simulation will arrive at full community consensus usually on the
correct theory, and sometimes on the wrong one.27 In our models, on the other hand, over
all parameter values, we found that only 10% of trials ended in false consensus, 40% in true
consensus, and 50% in polarization. These values should not be taken too seriously, since pa-
rameter choices influence where and when polarization happens, but the point is that adding
evidential assessments based on shared belief dependably generates stable polarization.
The multiplier determining how quickly scientists discount the evidence of others, m,
strongly determines how often polarization occurs. Of course, this is no surprise since
the mechanism necessary to generate polarization is strengthened and weakened via this
multiplier. Figure 2 shows this effect for simulations with different numbers of agents. This
trend, and others reported in this section, are general across parameters unless otherwise
noted. As is clear, higher m leads to higher polarization. As we also see in this figure, the
chance of reaching a polarized outcome increases slightly in community size. This is simply
because with a larger group the chances are better that at least one agent stably disagrees
with the rest.
Figure 3 demonstrates this phenomenon in heatmap form for different values of m and pB
(success rates for the better theory). As is evident again, higher m means more polarization.
This effect is ameliorated somewhat when pB is higher, because strong evidence for theory
B tends to drive beliefs up more quickly. Still, even when the better theory is obviously
better, once trust is low enough, polarization emerges in almost all cases. We see here the
robustness of this effect across parameter values.
This sort of polarization will only occur when m is high enough that there are credences
an agent could hold and be entirely unaffected by evidence coming from the part of the
community that converges to high credence in theory B. For instance if m = 1.1, all agents
26Notice that this operationalization of polarization means that simulations where one individual holds
a stable minority opinion still counts as polarization. One might object that true cases of polarization will
involve more evenly sized subgroups. For practical reasons, we prefer not to choose an arbitrary cut-off for
what proportion of a population must hold each opinion in order to count as truly polarized. Bramson et al.
(2017) discuss subtleties of how groups can polarize.
27The probability of correct versus incorrect convergence varies based on parameter values. See Zollman
(2007, 2010); Rosenstock et al. (2017) for more.
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Figure 2: Increasing m increases probability of polarization. n = 50, pB = .7.
Figure 3: Increasing m increases probability of polarization, this is mitigated when pB is higher. K = 10,
n = 20.
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Figure 4: Uncertainty (m = 1) slows consensus compared to no uncertainty (m = 0), even though polariza-
tion is not possible for either of these values of m. pB = .55, K = 6.
update on the evidence of almost all other agents. But, an agent with credence .04 will not
update on evidence from an agent with credence .99 at all, meaning polarization is possi-
ble. When m = 1, on the other hand, there are no stable polarized outcomes. Eventually
all agents will reach consensus on either theory A or theory B. But even in this case, Jef-
frey conditionalization can lead to transient polarization—the temporary existence of two
subgroups one of which has very high credences (> .99) and the other with credences < .5.
Moreover, although the whole population will always converge to some consensus in
this case, the time to convergence is substantially longer than when m = 0. And in the
meantime there is a potentially very long period during which some portion of the community
is mistrustful of an emerging consensus. Figure 4 shows the average speed at which a
community reaches consensus when m = 1 or m = 0, for various numbers of pulls, n.
Notice that the y-axis is on a log scale to make the trend more clear. For all values, adding
uncertainty about the evidence of those with different beliefs slowed convergence to consensus
by a factor of 2 or 3 on average.
This occurs because the addition of uncertainty about evidence and Jeffrey condition-
alization to the model creates new updating dynamics. The key, here, is that although all
agents in our model have access to the same evidence every round of simulation (because
they are on complete networks) they all treat that evidence differently. Say an agent with
credence .55 happens to gather a string of data spuriously supporting theory A, and another
agent with credence .9 happens to gather a string of data that correctly supports theory B.
Despite all agents receiving the same data, those with already low credences will tend to
decrease their credence further, while those with high credences will increase them in the
same round.
This sort of behavior can lead to feedback loops, by which agents who have more similar
14
credences gradually diverge—and then trust one another less as a result. For instance,
consider two agents with initial credences .6 and .3. The .6 agent tests the informative
action and generates results indicating that theory B is, in fact, better. They update by
increasing their credence in theory B. The .3 agent also updates their credence in theory
B, but by a much smaller amount because the distance between them (.3), leads her to
discount the evidence. Say that their new credences are .88 and .45. The .88 agent tests the
informative theory again. This time, again, they both update in the same direction, but the
distance between them is now .43, so the .45 agent is more mistrustful than before. Via this
sort of process, a belief gap and a trust gap can emerge between those who have become
converts to a new theory and those who remain skeptical.28
There is one last result to mention, which is that the size of the multiplier determines
the proportion of the community, on average, that ends up holding the false belief when
polarization happens. For large multipliers, and thus higher levels of mistrust, more agents
tend to end up believing in the worse theory A. If they are initially skeptical, they also do
not trust those who take the informative action, and so tend to stick with their skeptical
beliefs. For smaller multipliers, and so more trust in others, a larger percentage of agents
have beliefs that are pulled up to the better theory by those testing this theory. What this
means is that, in general, mistrust in others with different beliefs results in a much higher
degree of incorrect belief than would otherwise occur.
Figure 5 shows the average number of individuals who end up stably convinced in the
incorrect theory as the multiplier increases. Each data point in this figure is the percentage
of false beliefs across runs of simulation for one set of parameter values. As is clear, as the
multiplier m increases, the average percentage of false beliefs does too. A lack of trust in
others based simply on their beliefs leads to a community in a worse epistemic state. Of
course, this is in a model where all actors are epistemically reliable in the sense that they
gather and share dependable data, and there are no biased agents in the scientific network.
In the conclusion, we will discuss when and why it might be a good thing not to trust those
in a scientific network.
4.2. Anti-updating
We now turn to the case where agents are so mistrustful of those with different beliefs that
they sometimes expect others to actively seek to mislead, and thus use Eq. (1) to assign
credences to evidence reported by others. In this case, again, we find that communities
reach stable polarization. The actual outcomes are somewhat different with anti-updating.
Mistrust in those with high credences now drives the beliefs of those with low credences
further and further down over time. This is analogous to the conservative who, upon learning
about scientific consensus about climate change, updates to greater skepticism about climate
change (Cook and Lewandowsky, 2016). When polarization occurs in these models, then, the
agents form two subgroups whose credences are either > .99, or < .01, and are increasingly
28The values in this example were calculated assuming that pB = .6, n = 10, and assuming that the .6
agent sees 7 successes in their test.
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Figure 5: Average percentage of false beliefs in scientific communities for different parameter values as a
function of m, which tracks how quickly agents become uncertain in the evidence of others as beliefs diverge.
unlikely to ever leave these ranges.
In models with anti-updating, polarization arises slightly more often than in models
without it. This occurs when there are individuals who might have been positively influ-
enced by their own results, or those of nearby agents taking the informative action, but
who are so mistrustful of those with high credences that their anti-updating overwhelms
the good evidence reaching them. In cases without anti-updating these individuals might
eventually reach the correct belief, but in the presence of anti-updating they do not because
the comparative zealots are too influential.
Additionally, anti-updating tends to increase the number of individuals arriving at the
incorrect belief in comparison to simply ignoring others’ data. Figure 6 shows the percentage
on average of agents arriving at true and false beliefs in the two types of model.29 As is
obvious in this case, anti-updating leads to worse beliefs, and this is more dramatic as m
increases. Anti-updating means that more individuals who might be convinced by other
moderates like themselves end up driven to low credences.
5. Conclusion
Mayo-Wilson et al. (2011) describe what they call the Independence Thesis, which consists
in the claims that, “rational individuals can form irrational groups, and, conversely, rational
groups might be composed of irrational individuals” (653). They point out that the entire
field of social epistemology is undergirded by the assumption that community and individual
29The significance of the difference between the anti-updating case and the ignoring case varies across
parameter values. In a few cases the community did slightly better on average in the anti-updating case,
usually for small communities where results were more stochastic.
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Figure 6: Models where actors anti-update tend to have a larger portion of false beliefs, as a result of
increased polarization. pB = .7, n = 10, population size = 20.
rationality come apart, meaning that in order to best understand the progress of knowledge,
we need to focus on the group level rather than just on individual rationality.30
The models here fall broadly under the heading of showing how what makes sense for
an individual, and what makes sense for a group, can come apart. Clearly, treating the
evidence of those with different beliefs as uncertain can have detrimental effects from the
group-level standpoint. The greater m is, the worse the average beliefs of the scientists in
our models. And when actors anti-update, this situation is exacerbated.31
On the other hand, while we might not want to label it as rational with a capital “R”,
there is something reasonable about deciding on an individual level whose evidence to trust
on the basis of their currently held beliefs. Suppose your Uncle Matt tells you that Hillary
Clinton personally had 46 journalists killed, and that he has the documents to prove it. If
30As Mayo-Wilson et al. (2011) prove using network epistemology models similar to the ones we employ
here, there are rules for exploration in such models that are ideal for the individual, but not the group, and
vice versa. Other formal work in social epistemology focuses on this idea as well. Both Kitcher (1990) and
Strevens (2003), for example, explore how to generate an ideal division of cognitive labor in science despite
the individual rationality of always working on the most promising theory.
31Notice that we do not discuss here potential benefits from transient polarization. For example, Zollman
(2010) argues for the importance of transient diversity of opinions in epistemic groups. (Without this
diversity, there is less chance that scientists spend enough time testing every plausible theory to see which
is best.) Since polarization ensures an extended diversity of beliefs, it may increase the chances that the
scientific communities as a whole gathers good evidence about all plausible theories. Likewise, in Zollman
(2010), a community can benefit from the presence of individuals with strong priors, who keep exploring a
theory even when it looks unpromising. The problem, in his models and in ours, is individuals who are too
stubborn, or who never update in light of untrusted evidence. We also do not discuss potential benefits of
political polarization identified by political scientists, such as a more robust, argumentative discourse. (See
Abramowitz (2010) for a discussion.)
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you also know Uncle Matt believes that your aura will be more aligned when there is lots of
quartz in the ground, you might take his documents less seriously, and with good reason. If
your pediatrician tells you that cow’s milk has “no nutrition in it”, it is, again, reasonable not
to trust other data she might later share. In the case of scientists, those who directly uptake
evidence without considering the source might even be considered epistemically irresponsible.
Most scientists do not trust the evidence of known “quacks”, and for good reason.
Nonetheless, one possible take-away from the models presented here might be that in
a scientific community we should do whatever it can to drop this heuristic, and evaluate
all evidence in the same way. But notice that these models do not capture the type of
situation in which discounting the evidence of others makes sense. In some cases, individuals
in a scientific community intentionally mislead peers for their own benefit. In 1954, for
example, the Tobacco Industry Research Committee was created with the stated goal of
investigating the health effects of smoking. In fact the committee was a propaganda machine
created by the heads of major tobacco firms, but from the point of view of those receiving
information from them, there was little to distinguish this source from others.32 Among
their activities was selectively sharing intentionally misleading results, with the intention of
manipulating beliefs. In such cases, one would certainly prefer to evaluate the evidence they
share differently from evidence shared by unbiased scientists.
Holman and Bruner (2015) investigate a network epistemology model much like the one
we look at here, but which includes an “intransigently biased agent”. The biased agent
only tests the worse theory, and when they do so, their probability of success is artificially
inflated. Holman and Bruner find that such an actor tends to influence the beliefs of their
community in a negative way, but that if other scientists have an option to devalue their
evidence the problem is ameliorated. Their model incorporates this devaluation by placing
weights on every network edge. When a scientist receives new evidence, they do a t-test
based on their current credence in the theory. If the evidence seems particularly unlikely
given their beliefs, they reduce their weight on that edge. As they show, “The problem
posed by intransigently biased agents can be alleviated if agents learn to identify and trust
good informants.” (966). In other words, in the model with industry actors, the option to
ignore others’ data is crucial to the success of the community.
Notably, ignoring in their model is based on a match between evidence and one’s own
credence, not between another’s credence and one’s own as in our model. As they note
some scientists sometimes end up in the biased agent’s sphere of influence because their
credences are influenced by the biased agent’s evidence, and then the biased evidence looks
plausible to them. This, in itself, is a type of polarization where one part of the community
holds a different belief and takes a different action from the other part, and the two groups
have little influence over each other. It results, as in other models of polarization, from the
fact that there is a dependence between the beliefs of scientists and social influence of the
biased agent. But, despite the possibility of this sort of polarization, the ability to evaluate
32This history is drawn from Oreskes and Conway (2010), who document in great detail the work done
by big tobacco to obscure the emerging consensus over the health dangers of smoking. See also Holman and
Bruner (2015), O’Connor and Weatherall (2019), and Weatherall et al. (2017).
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evidence based on whether it accords with one’s scientifically informed belief is a good thing
in these models. It significantly improves the epistemic states of scientists.
Additionally, one might want to distrust evidence from scientists who are less depend-
able than others, which, again, is a possibility our models does not address. Barrett et al.
(2017) present a model that approximately captures this sort of situation. They consider
a networked group of agents who all have an option to test the world, with different char-
acteristic rates of success. These agents can also choose to consult the conclusions of their
peers, again with different rates of successful social transmission. They find that if they
allow such networks to evolve, i.e. the agents update their probabilities of testing the world
and consulting other agents based on the success of these strategies, the final results are
often very successful compared to random starting points. In other words, the ability to
choose to listen to those who have been epistemically reliable in the past helps all agents
develop better beliefs. Again, we see a case where it is good not just for the individual, but
also for the group, for agents to ignore the evidence of some peers and favor the evidence of
others.
It seems, then, that while there are multiple heuristics available for treating evidence
from unreliable or biased agents, any of which may seem justified at the individual level,
they can lead to different outcomes at the group level. In our model, scientists condition
their trust in evidence of others based on distance in belief, which is simple but can have
bad effects for the community at large. The heuristic in Holman and Bruner (2015) involves
updating less strongly on evidence that does not fit with one’s current beliefs, and can also
lead to polarization. But consider a different—albeit more difficult—heuristic: suppose that
scientists learn to be uncertain about sources whose evidence persistently differs, statistically,
from most other sources. These scientists can also avoid being misled, and may do so without
negatively affecting the epistemic performance of the community. The point is that while
belief similarity and confirmation bias are easy heuristics to depend on in deciding who
to trust, there are other ways to make this decision that do not risk driving a community
towards polarization.
We will conclude with a discussion about what the models we have presented here can
and cannot tell us about polarization in real scientific communities, returning to the case
of chronic Lyme disease. Obviously these models are highly idealized. Real humans, for
example, are not perfect Bayesians, and many aspects go into scientists’ decisions about
what data to trust. Nonetheless, the models can do a few things. First, they show how, in
principle, a situation like that in the chronic Lyme case can arise. We do not need to suppose
that anyone is a bad researcher (in our models all agents are identical), or that they are
bought by industry, or even that they engage in something like confirmation bias or other
forms of motivated reasoning to see communities with stable scientific polarization emerge.
All it takes is some mistrust in the data of those who hold different beliefs to get scientific
polarization. In addition, these models provide a robustness check on previous models of
polarization by showing once more how the general feature responsible for it—dependence
between shared beliefs/opinions/features and social influence—can lead to polarization even
in a situation where it might not be expected because there are clear reasons to prefer one
belief over another, and all agents have the capacity to directly test their beliefs.
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The models also suggest a few interventions if, indeed, mistrust of those with different
opinions is helping to drive polarization in the chronic Lyme case. In particular, one possible
solution is to find a neutral party—for example, a group of independent researchers con-
vened through the National Science Foundation—to do meta-analyses and survey articles on
Lyme disease. The hope is that entrenched researchers suspicious of the ‘other side’ might
nonetheless be willing to trust individuals with beliefs less divergent from their own.
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